Purpose -We assess the risk-related disclosure practices in annual reports for 2005 of Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector.
Introduction
There have been many calls to reduce asymmetries of access to corporate information and to improve the measurement and disclosure of risk-related matters (Szegö, 2002; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Mohobbot, 2005) . Such calls have been prompted by the inadequacy of risk reporting practices (Solomon et al., 2000) .
Most existing studies of risk-related disclosures [RRD] are based on empirical evidence from Anglo-Saxon, Dutch and Germanic countries (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Carlon et al., 2003; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) ; French and Latin countries (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006) ; Asia-Pacific countries (Amran et al., 2009; Mohobbot, 2005) ; and Arab countries (Hassan, 2009 ). Generally, these prior studies have found that RRD are vague, generic, qualitative, backward looking, and inadequate for the information needs of stakeholders.
Previous literature has focused mainly on explaining RRD in terms of stakeholder theory (Anram et al., 2009) , institutional theory (Hassan, 2009) or agency theory (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Lajili, 2007) . The present study is a response to the call by Roberts et al., (2005, p. 6 ) "for greater theoretical pluralism and more detailed attention to board processes and dynamics." We proceed by proposing a theoretical framework based on a confluence of agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives. Such a framework was suggested by Roberts et al. (2005) and Aguilera (2005) but has not been used hitherto. We use this framework to address the thinness of empirical evidence by analysing disclosures of risk exposures and risk management practices in the annual reports for 2005 of non-finance companies registered by the Portuguese Stock Exchange regulator, Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários [CMVM] . Thus, we aim to ameliorate the incompleteness of prior research studies, and do so in the context of a different (and under-researched Our results reveal that the adoption of IAS/IFRS and the Modernisation Directive did not affect the quantity and quality of RRD positively. Risk information disclosures were mainly vague, generic, qualitative, backward-looking, dispersed throughout the annual report, and inadequate for the information needs of stakeholders. They confirm the results of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) , Carlon et al. (2003) , Combes-Thuélin et al. (2006) , Kajuter (2006) , Lajili and Zéghal (2005) , and Linsley and Shrives (2006) . Important influences on RRD are found to be reputation and litigation costs in companies with high public visibility (typically large companies in environmentally sensitive industries) and often with high levels of leverage. Agency costs were found likely to be reduced by the engagement of a Big4 auditing firm. When considering the sub-sample composed only of the 42 listed companies, the monitoring provided by independent directors also appeared to reduce agency costs.
In the following section we develop an analytical framework to contextualise the regulatory setting in Portugal, review previous literature, and develop hypotheses for testing. Thereafter, we explain our research method, report results, and present conclusions.
Analytical Framework

Regulatory Background
For financial years starting on January report. In respect of financial instruments companies were required also to describe their financial risk exposures and risk management activities related to financial risks.
In this study, risk information disclosures are classified as mandatory if they are provided as a consequence of an explicit accounting rule or security exchange requirement. If the disclosed item involves management's judgment or discretion in terms of materiality and significance, it is classified as voluntary [2] .
Prior Literature on Risk-Related Disclosures
Several studies have noted the inadequacy and vagueness of RRD. Carlon et al. (2003) found that the application of risk reporting requirements related to financial instruments was diverse, and that there was a large variation in the content and detail of voluntary risk reporting by Australian mining companies. In Italian and Canadian listed companies, voluntary RRD were mainly qualitative and focused on past and present risks rather than future risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005) . Linsley and Shrives (2006) found that RRD by UK listed companies were mainly qualitative, but that they were prone to report forward-looking risk information. Kajüter (2006) found that mandatory RRD of German companies in management reports was vague; that few RRD were precise and detailed; that most risks were described insufficiently;
and that it was difficult to distinguish risks in terms of criticality. Some other studies have commented on the difficulty of assessing company risk profiles because of unstandardized presentation of risk in annual reports and because of the dispersal of RRD throughout the annual report (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2006 (Deumes & Knechel, 2008) ; voluntary RRD in annual reports and MD&A sections (Mohobbot, 2005; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004) ; mandatory RRD in the management report (Kajuter, 2006) ; and voluntary and mandatory RRD in annual reports (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Amram et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006 ).
We adopt a broad concept of risk (including downside risk and upside risk) by considering whether risk is perceived as a threat (bad news) or as an opportunity to mitigate risk (good news). We regard risk to be any opportunity or prospect (or any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure) that has affected the economic and financial situation of a company or may affect it in the future. Risk is regarded to include actions taken to manage, mitigate or deal with any opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat, or exposure; and the description and evaluation of internal control system effectiveness.
We draw on findings of that companies make more risk management disclosures than risk disclosures in an attempt to promote an image of pro-active management (CombesThuélin et al., 2006) , Literature on RRD can be divided into three major groups, according to how the dependent variable is measured. As shown in Table 1 , prior studies have used content analysis to build the dependent variable using sentences as the recording unit (Amran et al., 2009; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Mohobbot, 2005) , or words (Abraham & Cox, 2007) , or disclosure indexes (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009 and Abraham and Cox (2007) , Deumes and Knechel (2008) , and Lajili (2007) used agency assumptions to explain motivations for RRD. Table 1 presents the explanatory variables and empirical findings of each of the major studies. Some conflicting results are revealed. The studies explain several identical relationships between explanatory variables and the dependent variable, but by recourse to different theories. The present study conciliates this theoretical conflict by proposing a theoretical framework that has been suggested in prior literature, but not tested: that is, by explaining RRD as being grounded in agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective (Roberts et al., 2005; Aguilera, 2005) .
Development of Hypotheses
Agency theory
Agency theory explains how information asymmetry between shareholders, managers and creditors can be reduced by monitoring the opportunistic attitudes of managers. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . If shareholders and creditors do not observe companies' risk management activities directly, they will tend to institute monitoring systems to increase the flow of information about those activities, and to reduce uncertainty (Linsmeier et al., 2002) . In the absence of such monitoring mechanisms, managers seem more likely to perform opportunistically by withholding relevant information or by manipulating reporting to their advantage by making misleading disclosures (Latham & Jacobs, 2000) . Four monitoring mechanisms (discussed below) are: the nature of the specific ownership structures (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2009; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili, 2007) ; the way the board of directors is composed (especially in terms of the number of independent non-executive directors) (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Lajili, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008) ; the independence of audit committees (Fraser & Henry, 2007) , and the type of external auditor appointed (Oliveira et al., 2004) .
Ownership Structure
In more concentrated ownership structures, agency costs are usually lower than in more diffuse structures involving outside ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ball et al., 2000; Deumes & Knechel, 2008) . Because larger shareholders play an active role in monitoring and controlling a firm, and are more willing to discipline poorly performing management, they can mitigate agency costs by intervening actively (Birt et al., 2006) . Thus, there is less need for RRD. In more diffuse structures, agency problems increase because small shareholders find it more difficult to monitor the activities of management (Barako et al., 2006) , and so greater levels of disclosure are expected.
However, the literature offers two opposing views of the relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure: convergence of interests and management entrenchment. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when the shareholding of the largest shareholder is high, and outside investors perceive that he/she behaves to maximize firm value, convergence of interests between them can occur. Outside investors will impose fewer contractual constraints on the firm, reducing agency costs.
Since agency costs are lower there will be weaker incentives for the largest shareholder to manipulate or withhold information. There will be incentives to maintain levels of disclosure consistent with the maximization of firm value. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between owners' holdings and disclosure.
In the case of management entrenchment, Morck et al. (1988) argue that moral hazard problems will occur and information asymmetries increase, so that consequently, a negative relation between insider holdings and disclosure should be expected.
Furthermore, Jung and Kwon (2002) 
Independent Non-Executive Directors
Theoretically, independent non-executive directors monitor the activities of executive directors indirectly (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008) . But non-executive directors are exposed to higher levels of risk, personally. This is because, by acting as corporate outsiders, they usually have little involvement in a company's daily management (Lim et al., 2007) . They have incentives to demand the disclosure of more information to balance the levels of risk to their personal reputation. In theory, independent nonexecutive directors are not influenced by corporate insiders. Thus, a higher level of disclosure can be expected from companies with a higher proportion of independent directors (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007) . Consequently, to reduce agency costs, companies with a higher percentage of independent directors will be prone to disclose more information.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the proportion of independent (non-executive directors) on the board and the volume
of RRD in an annual report.
Audit Committee Independence
As companies become larger, complex and diversified, it becomes more difficult for boards to retain effective control and to manage risks. As a consequence, responsibility for control is often delegated to employees. Where such delegation occurs, it is understandable that boards would require support from organization-wide monitoring mechanisms, such as audit committees (Fraser & Henry, 2007) . However, for an audit committee to be effective it should be independent and include non-executive directors (Turley & Zaman, 2004) . Therefore, companies with a higher proportion of nonexecutive directors serving on their audit committee are likely to attach greater importance to RRD and to the reduction of agency costs. 
Auditor Type
Companies with high agency costs tend to contract higher quality auditing firms -the Big4 international auditing firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . These larger and wellknown auditing firms tend to encourage companies to disclose more information to maintain the audit firms' reputation and avoid reputational costs to them (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004 ).
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between the engagement of a Big4 international auditing firm and the volume of RRD in an annual
report.
Leverage
Companies with high levels of debt tend to be highly leveraged, more speculative and riskier. Debt-holders have greater power over the financial structure of such companies.
From an agency theory perspective, creditors of highly leveraged companies have strong incentives to encourage management to disclose more information (Amran et al., 2009 ). Most prior literature has not found any significant relationship between RRD and leverage (Abraham & Cox, 2005; Amran et al., 2009; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Mohoboot, 2005) . A possible explanation seems likely to be that monitoring information can be furnished by means other than in the annual report (Leuz et al., 2004 ).
Hypothesis 5: There is an association between leverage and the volume of RRD in
an annual report.
Legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective
Managers have incentives to increase the transparency of RRD by conforming to rules and stakeholder expectations. Stakeholders are interested in RRD because they "supply critical resources, place something of value 'at risk', and have sufficient power to affect the performance of the enterprise" (Post et al., 2002, p. 8, italics applied) .
Resources-based perspectives address the link between a firm's valuable resources and its performance (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006a) . To be valuable, resources should be difficult to imitate and, therefore, help in developing competitive advantages. One such valuable resource is corporate reputation-an intangible asset that is nurtured to fulfil stakeholders' expectations and attract investors and resources (Galbreath, 2005) .
Stakeholders "will come to the firm attracted by the information content of its reputation" (Sabaté & Puente, 2003, p. 281) . Therefore, the economic rationale for building corporate reputation is to "reflect the extent to which external stakeholders see a firm as 'good' and not 'bad'" (Roberts & Dowling, 2002 , p. 1078 .
Like legitimacy, reputation must be gained, maintained or restored (Suchman, 1995) . Greater levels of public visibility imply a greater level of stakeholders' interest.
Consequently, greater levels of legitimacy and corporate reputation will be required to manage the crucial stakeholders who provide resources to organizations and affect their ability to operate (O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, 2009 ). This legitimation process rests strongly on the influential perceptions of crucial stakeholders of the firm's actions and activities, based on a specified level of public disclosure (O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, 2009 ). Disclosure of risk information will help to ameliorate litigation risks and potential reputational damages. Thus, legitimacy is maintained through a legitimation process to manage corporate reputation and achieve the best interests of stakeholders by disclosure (Bebbington et al., 2008) . Commonly, proxies for public visibility have included size, and industry variables (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a , 2008b . Brammer and Pavlin (2008, p. 124) argue that "larger firms (...) tend to be more visible to relevant publics [crucial stakeholders]." It is likely that larger companies will consider RRD as a way to enhance corporate reputation through disclosure. This is because greater levels of public visibility imply a closer scrutiny from stakeholders (Amram et al., 2009; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a 
Size
Environmental Sensitivity
Risks are firm-specific (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004) . Manufacturing industries and politically and environmentally sensitive industries (such as oil, gas, or high technology) are prone to disclose more information (Brammer & Pavlin, 2008; Cooke, 1992; Hannifa & Cooke, 2002) . Environmentally sensitive companies have greater social pressures in terms of stakeholder scrutiny. Managers of such companies have incentives to make more RRD to influence stakeholders' perceptions of corporate reputation and management skills. 
Control variables
Company Listing Status
Company listing status has been used as a proxy for public visibility (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006b; Leventis & Weetman, 2004) . Listed companies are considered to be more visible than other companies, they tend to receive more attention from the general public and are subject to more extensive media coverage (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006b ).
But, listed companies usually have greater agency costs (Oliveira et al., 2006; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007) . Thus, greater levels of RRD are expected.
Accounting Standards
The accounting standards adopted can generate different levels of disclosure. In our sample some companies adopted the PAP, and others adopted IAS/IFRS for the first time. 
Research Method
Dependent Variables
We used content analysis to quantify RRD. Our specific measure was formulated from categories used by Abraham and Cox (2007 Four semantic properties of the information disclosed were used in the content analysis:
• economic sign (monetary/non-monetary);
• type of measure (past/future);
• outlook (good/bad/neutral); and
• type of disclosure (voluntary/mandatory) (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) . Abraham and Cox (2007) used words as the recording unit and only analysed the narrative content. We assess the narrative content of the annual reports using sentences as the recording unit, in view of the findings of Milne and Adler (1999) that sentences are more reliable than words and pages in capturing thematic approaches. Information in graphs and tables was coded after establishing specific decision rules based on methods used by Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beattie and Thomson (2007) . The riskrelated disclosure level for the j th company was calculated as: To assure the reliability of the content analysis, we followed the methods outlined
by Krippendorf (2004) . Our coding drew upon procedures used by Lajili and Zéghal (2005) , and Linsley and Shrives (2006) . Content analysis of the entire sample was performed by the first author, informed by his prior coding of an initial sample of five annual reports with another (independently operating) coder. The prior coding helped refine a set of pre-established decision rules which were then applied to another sample of five annual reports that were coded independently by the two coders. Scott's pi measure of inter-rater reliability was 0.81 -a level considered acceptable in analysis of corporate report disclosures (Hackston & Milne, 1996) .
Independent and Control Variables
Table 2 presents definitions of independent variables and control variables, together with the signs of these variables as they are likely to be predicted by agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective.
(Insert Table 2 (assessed by the highest proportion of voting rights that belong to a single shareholder), as proxies for ownership structures. These two proxies were highly correlated. A principal component analysis was also applied and an ownership structure index was computed to overcome potential collinearity. Only one component, explaining 87 per cent of the total variance, was extracted (Eigenvalue>1 The variable "independent non-executive directors" was proxied by the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board (Deumes & Knechel, 2008) .
The variable "audit committee independence" was proxied by the proportion of non-executive directors to total board members.
The variable "auditor type" was measured by a dummy variable that was assigned 1 if the auditing firm was a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006) .
"Leverage" was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009 construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metals electricity, gas distribution and water), and 0 otherwise (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b) .
Control Variables
A "company's listing status" was assigned 1 if the company was listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise.
The variable "Accounting Standards" was measured by considering the accounting frame of reference adopted by each company in 2005. Companies which adopted IAS/IFRS were assigned 1, and 0 otherwise.
Empirical models
The estimation models test whether factors associated with agency theory [A] and legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective [LRb] affect the volume of RRD in company j when we control for other company-level drivers of disclosure [C] . (Bhimani, 2009) it is unlikely to help readers understand whether the internal control system is effective, since it was descriptive, generic and often vague.
Results
Descriptive Analysis
The top band of Table 3 (Panel A) shows that the total number of sentences of bad news disclosure (n=1,548) and good news disclosure (n=1,611) are almost equal. These results are at odds with prior findings of higher levels of good news disclosures (Linsley & Shrives, 2006) . However, they are consistent with agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives: that is, managers promote an image of pro-activity by disclosing almost the same levels of risk and risk management information in order to reduce asymmetries (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006) .
About one third of risk disclosures were followed by discussion of how those risks are managed. If markets believe implicitly that "no news is bad news", and if companies did not disclose bad news, this would be interpreted as hiding some problems (Lundholm & Winkle, 2006) . Therefore, in accord with legitimacy theory and resourcebased perspectives, managers decrease reputation costs by disclosing bad news to increase the credibility of their reporting (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Skinner, 1994) .
The second band of Table 3 (Panel A) shows that backward-looking RRD are much more frequent than forward-looking disclosures. These results are consistent with Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and Lajili and Zéghal (2005) , but are inconsistent with Linsley and Shrives (2006) . These findings are also consistent with legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives incentives: backward-looking information usually is more reliable and has less potential to harm reputation.
The third band of Table 3 The fourth and bottom band of risks, but did not explain the methods and assumptions used. In general, the RRD seemed perfunctory. They were probably unhelpful in informing investors about the impact of each risk factor on company performance. Table 4 shows that the proportion of independent directors (mean = 0.14) on the board is very low compared to the proportion recommended by the CMVM of 0.25. The independence of the audit committee (mean = 0.36) is also low, possibly impairing RRD. The mean values for ownership structure confirm that Portugal has many familydominated companies with a complex network of ownership, and a substantial number of shares owned by other companies or one single shareholder (mean = 0.57) (Mota, 2003) . The variables for proportion of independent directors and for audit committee independence were only computed for listed companies (N = 42) because only listed companies disclose this information in their corporate governance reports.
Bivariate Analysis
Pearson correlation coefficients were determined among continuous variables and Spearman correlation coefficients were determined between categorical and continuous variables, as presented in Table 5 . The magnitude of the correlation coefficients and value inflated factors suggests that multicollinearity is minimal (Table 5) .
(Insert Table 5 about here)
Correlations between independent variables and RRD are significant (p-value < 0.01) for independent non-executive directors, audit committee independence, size, auditor type (p-value < 0.05) environmental sensitivity, (p-value < 0.1) ownership structure, and leverage, all with signs as predicted. Positive and significant (correlations p-value < 0.01) were found between the control variables and RRD.
Multiple Regressions
OLS multiple regressions were used to test the interrelationship between the various independent and control variables and RRD. The assumptions underlying the regression models were tested for autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, outliers and influential observations, and the normality of residuals. Four influential observations were removed from the analysis. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors test suggested that the raw dependent variables and the continuous independent variables were not distributed normally. Therefore, before running the regression models, dependent variables and continuous independent variables were transformed to normal scores using Blom's transformation (Cooke, 1998) . Table 6 shows that the regression model for listed and unlisted companies is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) for RRD (adj. R 2 = 0.26) [4] .
(Insert Table 6 about here) RRD is associated positively with size (p-value < 0.01), environmental sensitivity (p-value < 0.05), auditor type (p-value < 0.1), leverage (p-value < 0.1), and company listing status (p-value < 0.1). Hypotheses H4, H5, H6 and H7 are supported.
According to legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective, larger companies, and companies with higher levels of environmental sensitivity, disclose more risk-related information to manage stakeholders' perceptions about corporate reputation. According to agency theory, leveraged companies, and companies audited by Big4 auditing firms, disclose more risk-related information to reduce agency costs. Listed companies disclose more risk-related information than unlisted companies -this can be explained either by legitimacy theory or agency theory.
The variable, accounting standards, is not statistically significant. The adoption of IAS/IFRS did not affect levels of RRD positively.
Prior literature has found positive and significant associations between RRD and independent non-executive directors (Abrahamson & Cox, 2007; Lajili, 2007) . Using the sub-sample of the 42 listed companies, Table 6 shows that the regression model is significant (p-value < 0.01) for RRD (adj. R 2 = 0.32). RRD is associated positively with independent non-executive directors (p-value < 0.05). This supports H2. According to agency theory, independent non-executive directors are important in reducing agency costs. This may be the reason why H1 is not supported. In an encouraging sign, it appears they are pressing for disclosure even in companies with concentrated ownership. H3 (audit committee independence) was not supported. But, in most cases, the non-executive director members of the audit committee were independent. Table 7 summarises the results of our hypothesis testing. Public visibility (size and environmental sensitivity) is associated positively with total RRD, consistent with the legitimacy and resources-based perspectives adopted in this paper. The variables leverage and auditor type are positively associated with total RRD, as is independent non-executive directors, but in listed companies only. This result is consistent with agency theory.
(Insert Table 7 about here)
Results for ownership structure are consistent with Abraham and Cox (2007) , Bushee and Noe (2000) , and Mohobbot (2005), all of whom did not find any relation between ownership structure and RRD. Abraham and Cox (2007) and Bushee and Noe (2000) conclude that non-significant results are related to the investment planning strategies of institutional investors.
The non-significant relation between RRD and audit committee independence is consistent with Turley and Zaman (2004) who report that the effect of audit committee in controlling agency costs associated with high leverage is inconclusive. From the viewpoint of Fraser and Henry (2007) the contribution of audit committee independence to enterprise risk management is unclear. This corroborates Spira's (2003) call for more research to investigate the benefits of audit committees.
Conclusions
Our results support explanations of RRD that are based on a combination of agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives. Public visibility, assessed by size and environmental sensitivity, is a crucial part of company strategy to enhance legitimacy and manage corporate reputation through disclosure of risk-related information. Additionally, agency costs associated with leverage and the engagement of a Big4 international auditing firm are also important in explaining RRD. Based on an analysis of 42 listed companies, we conclude that independent non-executive directors are important in reducing agency costs in terms of RRD.
Our results also confirm that the adoption of high quality accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) did not render any improvement in the quantity of RRD. Similarly, the adoption of the Modernisation Directive did not improve the quality of RRD. We reveal
Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector as adopting generic risk reporting practices that lack comparability and transparency. Consequently, reader usefulness is impaired. This is consistent with prior research that has found a special focus on qualitative RRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006 ) and backward-looking RRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005) .
However, our results differ from Linsley and Shrives (2006) Definition of variables: Shareholdings greater than 10% = percentage of qualified shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling votes = highest percentage of voting rights that belong to a single shareholder; Independent non-executive director = percentage of independent non-executive directors in the board; Audit committee independence = percentage of non-executive directors in the audit committee; Auditor type = 1 if the auditing firm is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to total assets; Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the company belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise; Company listing status = 1 if the company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Accounting standards = 1 if the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise). Ownership structure = principal components analysis (Shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling votes); Independent non-executive director = percentage of independent non-executive directors in the board; Audit committee independence = percentage of non-executive directors in the audit committee; Auditor type = 1 if the auditing firm is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to total assets; Size = principal components analysis (Total assets; Total sales; Number of employees); Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the company belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise; Company listing status = 1 if the company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Accounting standards = 1 if the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise 
